Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Greece by Athanassopoulou, Ekavi
  
Ekavi Athanassopoulou 
Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and 
Greece 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Athanassopoulou, Ekavi (2011) Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Greece. IDEAS reports - 
special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR007. LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43500/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2011 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
Turkey and Greece
AN IMPROVED CLIMATE 
The history of relations between Turkey and Greece during most of the 20th century might be best characterised as one of hostility or perhaps even outright enmity. Since 1974 the 
Aegean confl ict concerning not only territorial air and sea rights but also sovereign rights 
over the Aegean seabed and its subsoil has been the central bone of contention between 
these two eastern Mediterranean countries. For both the economic, security and political 
implications of the issue are profound.
However in 1999 the Turkish and Greek governments of Bülent Ecevit and Kostas Simitis respectively 
began taking initial steps to improve bilateral relations and these efforts have continued under the 
subsequent governments of Tayip Erdogan in Turkey and of Kostas Karamanlis and more recently of 
George Papandreou in Greece. 
These mutual efforts have resulted in the establishment of a variety of instruments that are expected 
to help ameliorate relations. They include the regular exchange of high level visits, talks on Confi dence 
Building Measures (CBMs), working groups exploring possible fi elds of bilateral co-operation in areas 
of low politics as well as ‘exploratory contacts’ that seek to identify points of agreement regarding 
the more contentious issues of high politics.
So far, in terms of concrete outcomes, we can see a large number of CBMs and a good number of 
co-operation agreements covering a wide variety of issues including tourism, environmental protection, 
investment, policing matters and energy (notably Turkey and Greece became linked through the opening 
of an Azeri gas pipeline in 2007). It must be stressed that whilst most of the agreements are modest 
in terms of scale and goals they clearly mark the beginning of a de-escalation of tensions, which may 
eventually lead to further steps towards a conciliation between these two longstanding adversaries. 
Signifi cantly, one sector of society which has responded very positively to the improvement in relations 
between Greece and Turkey is the business community in both countries. The volume of bilateral trade 
has increased dramatically from approximately $US400 million in the 1988-99 period to approximately 
$US2.5 billion per year for the last fi ve years. Economic investment has also risen rapidly, refl ecting 
mainly the entry of Greek investors into the Turkish market, at least until the fi nancial crisis in Greece 
broke out.
However despite the improved bilateral climate it is still absolutely clear that in real terms progress at 
the high politics level has been limited, as none of the primary issues of contention between the two 
have been resolved, and there are few signs that Athens and Ankara are close to reaching a solution 
any time soon. 
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In fact it is these major issues of high politics which so 
often set back the efforts to build mutual confi dence 
and co-operation. Genuine trust is limited and both 
sides have been extremely careful not to accept 
agreements which may indirectly compromise their 
sovereign positions regarding the highly contentious 
Aegean issues.
At the same time, hardly any progress has been made 
regarding Cyprus, which remains a key litmus test 
for relations in general between the two countries. 
Greek governments have de-coupled their relations 
with Turkey from the Cyprus issue, refl ecting Athens’ 
acceptance of Nicosia as the primary negotiator for 
any long term solution on the island. By contrast, 
Ankara still asserts its right to dictate solutions for 
the island, whilst the Turkish military in particular feels 
the need to actively protect Turkey’s, and not just 
Turkish-Cypriot, interests in Cyprus. Hence, suspicion 
in Athens of underlying post-imperial expansionist 
currents in Turkish foreign policy will remain so long 
as Ankara essentially continues to project a hard-line 
attitude, showing no sign that it will reconsider its 
military occupation of Northern Cyprus.
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
It appears in general terms that the overall aim of the 
ongoing dialogue between Ankara and Athens since 
1999 has been to build mutual trust and by doing so 
to eventually achieve reconciliation over differences in 
the Aegean. But the particular and more immediate 
objectives of the two protagonists have been quite 
different. Essentially the Erdogan government, like 
its predecessor in power, has been hoping to resolve 
the range of the Aegean issues in a way that is as 
satisfactory as possible to Turkey’s interests. Hence, 
Turkish foreign policy makers have been disappointed 
that the ten-year-process to improve relations with 
Greece has not yet yielded the big results they had 
been hoping for. Furthermore they are also beginning 
to fear that the process is in serious danger of running 
out of steam unless it can lead to concrete agreements 
regarding the contentious high politics issues. Rightly 
or wrongly Ankara has attached more importance to 
the dialogue as a means to an end (solutions in the 
Aegean) rather than an as an end in itself (improved 
relations). As it has grown more and more frustrated 
Ankara has increased its diplomatic pressure on 
Athens to substantively address the Aegean issues. 
On the other hand, while exploring areas of possible 
convergence of ideas regarding the resolution of 
contentious issues, Athens has primarily considered 
the ongoing process of improving relations with 
Turkey as a means for avoiding a serious crisis 
developing in the Aegean. (This was particularly the 
case during the years 2004-2009 when the party 
of New Democracy was in government). Though 
many within Greek political and diplomatic circles 
have come to appreciate the value of ‘exploratory 
talks’ with their Turkish counterparts, the idea of 
actively working towards a fi nal settlement of the 
contentious Aegean issues through a mutually 
acceptable agreement, as Ankara has argued for, 
has provoked negative reactions across the political 
spectrum within Greek political and intellectual elites. 
Opponents argue that any agreement by Athens to 
work towards a settlement would be a victory for 
Turkish (and international) pressures at the expense 
of Greek sovereignty. In their eyes Turkey’s pressure 
for better bilateral relations is a thinly disguised way 
of facilitating its ambitions to emerge as a regional 
power. Ironically, recent public pronouncements by 
Turkish government offi cials stressing the economic 
and security benefi ts that both countries will enjoy 
by settling the Aegean issues have further fanned the 
suspicions of these opponents concerning Turkey’s 
motives. A majority among the Greek elites therefore 
remain deeply mistrustful of Ankara’s motives and 
its policy over Cyprus offers fuel for their concerns.
CONTROLLED TENSION
Where does this leave us? If improved relations 
between Turkey and Greece simply meant the 
implementation of modest CBMs, more trade and 
regular meetings between the leaders of the two 
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countries then the bilateral relationship seems better 
than perhaps at any time since the 1930s. But in the 
context of the issues that have bedevilled bilateral 
relations for over thirty years, these changes have 
not been profound. As a matter of fact the feeling 
both in Ankara and Athens is that they are reversible 
should a crisis occur.
Efforts by both sides to build channels of positive 
relations have not been anchored in genuine 
enthusiasm within foreign policy making circles or 
the learned public in either country. They have hardly 
inspired political leaders and they have rather passively 
been accepted by the general public, with the limited 
exception of some in the business community. To be 
more precise the step-by-step efforts at co-operation 
have so far been rather mechanical with the exception 
of a brief initial period (2000-2002), when progress 
in their bilateral relations was seen as instrumental 
in promoting bigger respective agendas. Turkey, 
which after much controversy had just become a 
candidate member of the EU, had to show real 
progress in its relations with Athens in order for 
its engagement with Brussels to evolve smoothly. 
Greece was also under pressure to improve relations 
with its neighbour in order to boost the case for the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. Moreover, Kostas 
Simitis’ government in Greece perceived a direct 
benefi t in facilitating Turkey’s engagement with the 
EU because this would encourage Ankara to abide 
by the European rules of conduct regarding issues 
that concerned Greece, including Cyprus. Perhaps 
it was inevitable for this initial momentum to slow 
since it was not motivated by a more deep-seated 
conviction, but other factors also contributed. In 
Greece the New Democracy government under the 
leadership of Kostas Karamanlis that came to power 
in 2003 was very sceptical of the benefi ts of this 
approach. At the same time the war in Iraq shifted 
Turkey’s foreign policy priorities away from the EU 
and towards more basic security interests within 
the context of its Kurdish issue. Thus the extremely 
cautious process of ‘exploratory contacts’ has not be 
given top priority in either capital.
Furthermore, if one cares to look beyond the rhetoric, 
the ‘contacts’ have not been built on the existence 
of strong good-will in Ankara or Athens to follow 
a new foreign policy paradigm in their engagement 
with each other, based exclusively on diplomacy, 
mutual assistance and the rejection of military 
might as a means of coercion. On the contrary they 
have been taking place also under the shadow of 
controlled tension in the Aegean. As a matter of 
fact Mr Davutoglu is far from questioning the role 
of military force as an instrument of pressure. As he 
stated in 2010 when he unveiled Turkey’s foreign 
policy ‘manifesto’ diplomatic problems have to be 
overcome through a balanced act between hard 
and soft power producing ‘harmony just like in an 
orchestra’. 
This is far from saying that the spectre of war 
between the two countries looms large, at least in 
the foreseeable future; indeed war has been unlikely 
for at least thirty years despite the fears of Greek 
political leaders and the general public alike. The 
modus operandi of Turkey and Greece has instead 
been crystallised in a game of controlled tension 
(mainly in the Aegean) that is used as a reminder to 
the other side of the lines that should not be crossed. 
So, when Mr Davutoglu asserts that ‘nobody expects a 
crisis between Turkey and any neighbour’, in our case 
Greece, one should carefully read between the lines. 
For instance, Athens has the right according to the 
international law to extend its territorial waters from 6 
to 12 miles. The Turks understandably strongly oppose 
such a change in the Aegean status quo as it would 
compromise their country’s economic and security 
interests. Ankara has been making it abundantly clear 
that it shall take all necessary measures including 
military ones, if necessary, to prevent this from 
happening. This constitutes a strong warning that has 
been taken very seriously by all Greek governments. 
Were a jingoistic government in Athens to ignore the 
warning and exercise this right shouldn’t we expect 
a crisis between Turkey and Greece? It is only very 
reasonable for anyone to assume that we should, 
though it may not take the form of a full-fl edged 
shooting match. Yet war is the eventuality Athens has 
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been fearing and assuming and is the main reason 
why every single Greek government has abstained 
from extending Greek territorial waters in the Aegean. 
Consequently, a crisis on this front between Turkey 
and Greece is unlikely, not because there has been a 
real shift in their traditional foreign policy paradigm, 
as Mr Davutoglu’s statement would have us believe, 
but because Greece in this case is fearful of a hardline 
response by Ankara. 
TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH GREECE IN BROADER 
CONTEXT 
The formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy is rarely the result of the ideas and actions 
of a single man even when he is a powerful leader. 
Most high-level foreign policy decisions result from 
the workings of small groups and are acted upon 
by bureaucracies. And policy and bureaucratic elites 
are guided in foreign affairs as in domestic affairs 
by their society’s culture. Therefore, the apparent 
infl uence of key foreign policy makers has to be 
understood more in the sense that they are able 
to capture and express the zeitgeist within their 
nation, or their country’s political elites, rather than 
in their personal acute contribution. Thus Turkey’s 
current policy stance towards Greece is essentially 
the refl ection of economic and political processes 
that have been gradually maturing in Turkey over 
the past thirty years as a result of changes at the 
domestic and the international level. 
Ankara’s active interest in improving relations with 
Greece through a dialogue to include both low (with 
a major emphasis on economic relations) and high 
politics issues fi rst emerged in the late 1980s, in 
parallel with a new phase of modernisation that Turkey 
was experiencing at that time. A new generation of 
Turkish economic and political elites embraced the 
idea of Turkey’s rapid integration into the modern 
world outside its borders. This idea was interwoven 
with the belief that Turkey needed to converge with 
the European Community (EC) (for economic but also 
political reasons). At the same time, they thought, 
Turkey needed to grasp the opportunities offered 
in the new emerging international environment of 
the late 1980s in order to more assertively further 
its interests in all directions from its borders, using 
both hard and soft power tools. This new approach, 
that in the late 1980s found a fervent advocate in 
Turkish Prime Minister and later President Turgut 
Özal, has so far been proven to be sustainable 
despite certain disruptions in the 1990s. The 
socialisation of Turkish political and bureaucratic 
elites with their European counterparts as a result 
of Turkey’s closer association with the European 
Union (EU) has reinforced this approach over the 
last fi fteen years. 
Within this broader context of Turkish foreign 
policy, relations with Greece fell into a category of 
their own due to Greece’s membership of the EC. 
Successive Greek governments pegged support for 
Turkey’s accession to the EC to Ankara abandoning 
its claims against Greek interests in the Aegean. 
Characteristically, in 1989 when the Commission 
turned down Turkey’s application for membership it 
justifi ed its refusal by referring among other issues 
to disputes with Greece and Cyprus. Ankara realised 
that it had to make an effort to better handle 
relations with Athens. However, this effort proved 
unsustainable during most of the 1990s. For one 
the dashing of hopes for Turkey’s accession to the 
EC any time soon took much of the wind out of 
the sails of those in Ankara who were arguing in 
favour of improving relations with Greece. But it 
was the Kurdish issue that had perhaps the biggest 
impact on the minds of the foreign policy makers 
in Ankara, and consequently greatly determined 
Turkey’s overall foreign policy during the 1990s. 
For most of that decade the Turkish state was 
faced with a growing Kurdish insurgency in the 
southeast of the country that reached alarming 
proportions for Ankara in the mid-1990s. The state 
of war between the Turkish state and the Kurdish 
insurgents, who were aided, one way or another 
by most of the neighbouring states, led to the 
accentuation of the state ideology that had been 
somewhat challenged in the 1980s, and which 
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portrayed Turkey as being surrounded by enemies. 
Greece was one of the countries on Ankara’s list of 
those thought to be aiding the Kurdish insurgents.
But in the late 1990s both the Turkish state’s 
relationship with the European Union (EU) and its 
Kurdish problem took a turn for the better. Though 
there were more low points to come, the EU accepted 
Turkey’s candidacy for membership in 1999, and 
Turkey’s commitment to the process that would open 
the way for its eventual membership was rekindled. 
Consequently Ankara began to reconsider once more 
the effects its foreign policy in general, and towards 
Greece in particular, were having on Turkey’s prospects 
for EU membership. Simultaneously the success of 
the Turkish state in the confl ict in the southeast in 
the late 1990s led to the gradual easing of tension 
with most neighbouring countries and the subsiding 
of the siege mentality that prevailed until then. These 
developments directly spurred Ankara’s interest in 
picking up the thread of improving relations with 
Athens that had been dropped in the early 1990s. 
At the end of the 1990s Turkish foreign policy 
makers, with renewed self-confi dence and zeal, 
availed themselves of opportunities all around Turkey’s 
borders in order to further its economic development 
and project Turkey’s infl uence by engaging more with 
its neighbours. Furthermore, they tried to harmonise 
their policies with those of the EU, to the extent that 
their perceptions of their interests and desire for 
independence of action allowed. 
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came 
to power it proved that, despite its more conservative 
social outlook, it was able to take forward this 
outward-looking policy. However, under the AKP, 
like in the past, when the Turkish state’s national 
narrative clashed with EU policies, as is the case with 
Cyprus, the belief that Turkey had to remain steadfast 
in its own approach prevailed in Ankara, despite the 
negative consequences for the smooth continuation 
of EU accession negotiations with Turkey. 
WIDER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
As long as the core issues between Turkey and Greece 
remain unresolved the recent improvement of their 
relations will remain tentative and, therefore reversals 
should not be ruled out. On the other hand, the 
foreign policy decision makers in both countries may 
prove able to sustain the current precarious balance 
in their bilateral relationship. Time will tell, but it 
is clear that both countries stand to benefi t from 
keeping tension between them low and exploring 
potential areas of co-operation. Over the longer term 
good relations and deeper co-operation between 
them will also be a signifi cant asset to European 
security. Challenges in the eastern Mediterranean may 
constitute major direct and indirect security concerns 
for the EU, including terrorist activities, instability due 
to violent regional confl icts in the Middle East and 
North Africa, illegal migration, and organised crime. 
Hence, co-operative and friendly relations between 
Greece and Turkey can make a signifi cant contribution 
to European security strategy. Furthermore, Greece 
and Turkey have a central role to play in the creation 
of an eastern Mediterranean energy corridor to serve 
the increasing energy demands of Western Europe. 
The United States’ security interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East also stand to 
benefi t from effective co-operation between Athens 
and Ankara, whether it is in the context of regional 
defence, regional development, and perhaps even 
American power projection in that part of the world. 
The future prospects of the bilateral relationship will 
be infl uenced by many factors. Clearly the course of 
relations between Turkey and the EU will be one of 
them, because the EU has played an essential role 
in shaping the Turkish (but also Greek) strategy of 
improving bilateral relations. The evolving course 
of Greece’s fi nancial crisis will be another. It can 
be argued that the Greeks should be expected to 
look forward to a settlement of the Aegean issues 
with Turkey in order to reduce the high defence 
burden they bear mainly because of the Turkish 
‘threat’. In fact exactly the opposite is true as the 
crisis has been playing into the hands of Greek neo-
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nationalists. How the power-contest in Turkey will 
fi nally be sorted out between the rivals, and where 
the emphasis in Turkey’s foreign policy is going to be 
will also have a role to play. But in the fi nal analysis 
the key parameter that will determine the future 
prospects of the relationship is the attitude towards 
the future of the societies and national leaders in 
both countries and, consequently, whether they are 
willing, and also able, to make a real paradigm shift 
in their foreign policy by de-emphasising traditional 
national security approaches which are still strong in 
Turkey and Greece. ■ 
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